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NFAC #738-81

11 February 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

Chief, NFAC Planning, Management & Evaluation Staff

SUBJECT : NSC Organization

[REDACTED]

1. Herewith a few brief comments on the package you dropped by this morning. It is clear that there has to be some mechanism for handling CA matters. Tab 1 seems to me an improvement over the present system as I understand it, but it seems too much imprecise on how things are to be done. It would seem preferable to establish a regulatory mechanism within the framework of the papers at Tab 2.

2. As to these, it perfectly obvious that there needs to be a mechanism for interagency coordination of intelligence and counter-intelligence matters as well as CA. It would be appropriate for the DCI to be responsible, except perhaps in the case of CA matters, where he must share responsibility with the Secretary of State. A third SIG for intelligence would thus appear to be a must, with the DCI in the chair.

3. There is a basic inconsistency between these directives and the conferring of Cabinet rank on the DCI. It is inappropriate for the DCI to sit on SIGs that are chaired by Deputy Secretaries or that the SIG that deals with intelligence should be chaired by a much diminished Assistant to the President. The intelligence SIG should be quite parallel to the other two. If a crisis management mechanism is needed -- and I think it is -- and if it is decided that this should be run out of the White House (not our problem), then it might well be chaired by the Assistant to the President with representation at the Deputy Secretary level. It should be remembered that all the SIGs are substructure to the NSC proper. The DCI's role should be that of a member of the NSC, leaving the supporting work to his deputies and staff.


4. One change in wording would go a long way toward clearing up confusion as to how we as an institution work with this new structure. If those paragraphs that specify the membership of regional and functional interagency groups specified that the representative from the CIA would normally be the appropriate NIO or would be the NIO unless otherwise directed by the DCI, we would at least have a system. In my view the NIO could then recommend how the Agency be represented in the long run. The proliferation of these groups makes it quite clear that the NIO

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cannot and should not attend them all, but there needs to be a network of relationships that will ensure protection of intelligence equities and provide a coherent flow of information upward and tasking downward within the DCI's organization. The NIOs cannot staff the Director for his NSC activities if they are not fully tied in to the NSC's substructure.



Richard Lehman
Chairman

National Intelligence Council

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